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Bogacz: Automobile Search

BRIGHT LINES AND OPAQUE CONTAINERS:
SEARCHING FOR REASONABLE RULES IN
AUTOMOBILE CASES:::
Stephen J. Bogacz, Esq.**
The task of discerning the differing limits of permissible police
conduct in regard to automobile searches under the Federal and
State Constitutions is a burden which we should not place upon
our citizens or our law enforcement officials at this juncture,
particularly when one of our goals in this area should be to
create workable and understandable rules which adequately
protect the rights of our citizens while assuring effective
administration of the criminal law .... Providing the police
officer in the field with a consistent, easily followed guideline
would certainly enhance the effectiveness of the police and, in
the long run, should also provide greater protection for the
individual. 1
These optimistic reflections were voiced by Judge Domenick
Gabrielli, in his concurring opinion, in the landmark case of
People v. Belton. 2 Yet eleven years and numerous plurality and
divided decisions later, we remain today perhaps even further
away from Judge Gabrielli's laudable goal. Neither police
officers, prosecutors, nor lower court judges have an unclouded
comprehension of the permissible scope of an automobile search.
The dearth of clear direction from our highest state court has
been unfortunate for both law enforcement and individual liberty.
While the New York Court of Appeals continues to wrangle over
abstract and conjectural differences, the police remain befuddled,
unsure of how to proceed in each particular scenario which
* An earlier version of this article was published in The New York Law
Journal,September 22, 1993, at 1.
** First Deputy Chief, Family Court Division, New York City
Corporation Counsel. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's
and do not necessarily reflect those of his office.
1. People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 57-58, 432 N.E.2d 745, 749-50, 447
N.Y.S.2d 873, 877-78 (1982) (Gabrielli, J., concurring).
2. Id. (Gabrielli, J., concurring).
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involves an automobile. Searches are undertaken which
compromise privacy interests. Some are upheld, others are
rebuffed, usually on intricate distinctions unappreciated by either
the average police, officer or the average citizen. Society is not
enhanced by legal hairsplitting; only those whose convictions are
reversed benefit. We need "workable and understandable rules."
The United States Supreme Court has crafted such a set of
"automobile case" rules which, while not flawless, are decidedly
preferable to New York's.
The "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement under
the Fourth Amendment was first announced by the Supreme
Court in Carroll v. United States.3 Acknowledging the inherent
mobility of automobiles, which renders the procurement of a
warrant impractical, as well as a diminished expectation of
privacy in vehicles, the Court upheld the warrantless search of a
car for which the police demonstrated probable cause. 4 The
Court drew a distinct contrast between the need for probable
cause to search the car and probable cause to arrest the driver,
holding that "[t]he right to search and the validity of the seizure
are not dependent on the right to arrest. They are dependent on
the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the
contents of the automobile offend against the law."' 5 The New
York Court of Appeals and United States Supreme Court would
unnecessarily complicate this forthright precept. Car searches
have since been scrutinized under a number of theories, including
searches based upon limited probable cause running only to
specific containers, 6 searches incident to the arrest of an occupant
of a car, 7 and searches based on reasonable suspicion, 8 in

3. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).

4. Id. at 150-59.
5. Id. at 158-59.
6. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979). See infra notes
17-20 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). See infra note
33 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). See infra notes
92-99 and accompanying text.
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addition to the automobile exception. Two or more of these
concepts often compliment one another. 9
After Carroll, the Supreme Court continued to construe the
automobile exception in a straightforward fashion. In Chambers
v. Maroney, 10 the Court reiterated the Carroll holding that "the
search of an auto on probable cause proceeds on a theory wholly
different from that justifying the search incident to an
arrest .... "11 Justice White set forth the applicable automobile
search standard:
For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the
one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the
probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand
carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given
probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the
12
Fourth Amendment.
This analysis is sound and the inquiry unambiguous. If the
probable cause under which the police searched the car satisfies
the criterion for securing a search warrant from a magistrate, the
search is sustained. This both comports with Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and is responsive to the practical concerns of
efficient law enforcement and of avoiding needless delays for the
occupants of the automobile.
The Supreme Court's objective analysis became clouded in the
late 1970's by a conflict over the types of containers which could
properly be searched under the automobile exception. In United
States v. Chadwick,13 a divided Court held that a footlocker
(which the police had probable cause to seize) recovered from a
car and impounded could not be searched without a warrant.
Reasoning that the footlocker's brief contact with the car did not
render it a true automobile search, 14 the Court asserted: "[t]he
9. See, e.g., Belton, 453 U.S. at 454; People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49,
435 N.E.2d 745, 447 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1982). See infra notes 33-36.
10. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
11. Id.
at 49.
12. Id.at 52 (emphasis added).
13. 433 U.S. 1, 6-16 (1976).

14. Id. at 11-13.
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factors which diminish the privacy aspects of an automobile do
not apply to respondents' footlocker." 15 The Court therefore
determined that a warrant was needed in order to search the
footlocker, which had been "safely immobilized" by the police. 16
In Arkansas v. Sanders,17 the Court applied the Chadwick
analysis to luggage properly seized from a taxi, with the
corresponding outcome. Justice Burger's concurring opinion, in
Sanders, illustrates the flaws in the Chadwick-Sanders reasoning,
when he admits to being unsure as to "whether [there] would be
a stronger or weaker case for requiring a warrant to search the
suitcase when a warrantless search of the automobile is otherwise
permissible." 18 The police in Sanders had probable cause to
believe that the particular suitcase held contraband. 19 When it
was lawfully seized from the taxicab, however, the Court found a
warrant to be essential prior to opening it.20 Under Carroll and
Chambers, however, no warrant was required for the police to
search the interior of cars which they had general probable cause
to believe contained contraband. In Carroll, the contraband was
located behind the upholstery of the seat from which the filling
had been removed; 2 1 in Chambers, it was concealed in a
compartment under the dashboard. 22 One may conclude from
these decisions that when the police search a car with general
15. Id. at 13.
16. Id.
17. 442 U.S. 753, 757-66 (1979).
18. Id. at 768 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
19. Id. at 761.
20. Id. at 763-65. The Court stated that
the State has failed to carry its burden of demonstrating the need for
warrantless searches of luggage properly taken from automobiles. A
closed suitcase in the trunk of an automobile may be as mobile as the
vehicle in which it rides. But as . . . noted in Chadwick, the exigency of

the mobility must be assessed at the point immediately before the
search--after the police have seized the object to be searched and have it
securely

within their

control ....

Once police

have

seized

a

suitcase . . . the extent of its mobility is in no way affected by the place
from which it was taken.
Id.at 763 (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1976)).
21. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 136 (1925).
22. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 44 (1970).
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probable cause (and less specific information), they may conduct
a broader search than when they act upon specific probable
cause. 23 This would appear to be the antithesis of the anticipated
and preferred result. In non-automobile search and seizure cases,

more specific information usually provides the police with greater
capacity to appropriately encroach upon privacy interests without

a warrant.
This anomalous conclusion was eliminated in California v.
Acevedo. 24 The Supreme Court halted its Chadwick-Sanders
digression, holding that "the Fourth Amendment does not compel
separate treatment for an automobile search that extends only to a
container within the vehicle." 25 Henceforth, the police may
search such a container without a warrant, so long as they have
26
probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence.

23. See Note, California v. Acevedo: The Ominous March of a Loyal Foot
Soldier, 52 LA. L. REV. 1225 (1992). The author discussed the conflict
between Chadwick and Ross, where searches in one instance are focused upon
specific containers as opposed to situations where the probable cause is focused
upon the entire vehicle. Id. at 1233. The author pointed out that prior to
Supreme Court review, the California Appellate Division in People v. Acevedo
"recognize[d] the anomalous nature of the Ross-Chadwick dichotomy" and
explained:
If police have probable cause to believe contraband is concealed in a
particular container, they must obtain a warrant before searching it,
even when it is being stored in a vehicle. If the investigation has, for
whatever reason, yet to focus on a particular container and there is only
probable cause to believe the contraband is located somewhere in an
automobile, officers may conduct a warrantless search of any containers
in the car that could reasonably conceal the evidence ....One
unfortunate feature of the rule is an incentive for police officers to
withhold evidence related to probable cause in order to fit within the
more generous confines of Ross. Despite misgivings concerning the
continuing validity of Chadwick after Ross, we are in no position to
ignore the Supreme Court's mandate.
Id. at 1233 (quoting People v. Acevedo, 265 Cal. Rptr. 23, 27 (1989), rev'd,
111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991)).
24. 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
25. Id. at 1989.
26. Id. at 1991. The Court reaffirmed the principle enunciated in United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982), by stating that

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1994

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 [1994], Art. 3

TOURO LAW REVIEW

684

[Vol 10

The Acevedo Court's reversion to the Carroll-Chambersrule is
unmistakable. 27 Chadwick and Sanders represented the Supreme
Court's notable divergence from its bright-line rule. 2 8 In New
York, however, such rules have been viewed more skeptically.
New York's first serious consideration of the CarrollChambers automobile exception came about circuitously as a
result of People v. Belton2 9 [hereinafter Belton 1]. The New York
Court of Appeals initially held that a search incident to the lawful
arrest of the driver of a car, whom the police removed from the

vehicle, did not extend to the pocket of his jacket in the back
seat. 30 The court relied upon the fact that the jacket was no
longer in the defendant's "grabbable area"' 3 1 in suppressing the
32

search.

"[tlhe scope of a warrantless search of an automobile ... is not defined
by the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted.
Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the places in which
there is probable cause to believe that it may be found."
Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1991 (emphasis added) (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at
824).
27. Acevedo, II1 S. Ct. at 1985-91. The Court stated that "Itihe
interpretation of the Carroll doctrine ...

now applies to all searches of

containers found in an automobile." Id. at 1991.
28. See id. at 1989-91. The Court noted that "[tihe Chadwick-Sanders rule
not only has failed to protect privacy but it also confused courts and police
officers and impeded effective law enforcement" due to its language
contradicting the holding in Carroll. Id. at 1989. "The Chadwich-Sanders rule
is the antithesis of a 'clear and unequivocal' guideline." Id. at 1990.
29. 50 N.Y.2d 447, 407 N.E.2d 420, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1980), rev'd,
453 U.S. 454 (1981).
30. Id. at 449, 407 N.E.2d at 421, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
31. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (defining "'the
area 'within his immediate control'

. .

. [as] the area from within which he

might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence"') (citations
omitted).
32. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d at 450-52, 407 N.E.2d at 422-23, 429 N.Y.S.2d at
476-77. The court found that although the arrest justified a warrantless search
for finding weapons within the arrestee's grabbable area, "it [did] not
transform the initial predicate into a carte blanche justification to rummage
through all articles which might bear some connection to the arrestee." Id. at
450-51, 407 N.E.2d at 422, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 576 (citations omitted).
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The Supreme Court reversed, finding that when the police have
lawfully arrested the occupant of a vehicle, they may, "as a
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger
compartment of that automobile,... [including] the contents of
any containers found within the passenger compartment." 33 The
Court undeniably employed a fiction-that the defendant, even
after being removed from the car, still had access to the entire
passenger compartment-in order to establish a bright-line rule
justifying the search of the entire compartment. Interestingly, the
Court's hypothesis did not emanate from the automobile
exception, but rather out of the concept of a search incident to a
lawful arrest.
On remand, the court of appeals declined to adopt the Supreme
Court's scope of search incident to arrest. 34 Instead, in People v.
Belton35 [hereinafter Belton 11], it utilized a theory overlooked in
Belton I, the automobile exception. The scope of the search
which the court now permitted under this exception was identical
to that which the Supreme Court upheld as incident to the arrest
of the vehicle's occupant, a search of the passenger compartment
and any closed container visible therein. 36 The court thus
introduced a new element to the automobile exception analysis,
probable cause to arrest an occupant of the vehicle. This factor
would eventually obscure the heretofore predominant inquiry
upon which the exception was established, probable cause to
search the car. It was now unclear as to whether New York's
automobile exception recognized the basis developed in Carroll
and Chambers, the reasonable justification the police had to
search the car, without any reference to probable cause to arrest.
33. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981). In a footnote, the
Court defined "container" as "closed or open glove compartments, consoles,
or other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger compartment, as
well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like. Our holding... does not
encompass the trunk." Id. at 460-61 n.4 (emphasis added).
34. 55 N.Y.2d 49, 432 N.E.2d 745, 447 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1982).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 52-55, 432 N.E.2d at 746-48, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 874-76. In
Belton II, the court declined to extend the scope of the authorized search to the
car's trunk. Id. at 54 n.3, 432 N.E.2d at 748 n.3, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 876 n.3.
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On the same day as Belton, the Supreme Court also decided
Robbins v. California,37 and entangled itself in the quagmire of
opaque containers. In facts remarkably similar to Belton, the
police search in Robbins went a bit further. The police uncovered
a recessed luggage compartment and retrieved a tote bag and two
opaque packages. 38 Under constraint of Chadwick and Sanders, a
plurality of the Court held that closed, opaque containers found
in a lawfully stopped and searched vehicle, could not be opened
without a warrant. 39 The Court also laid to rest the suggested
ambiguity regarding diverse levels of protection being afforded
40
different types of containers, which was intimated in Sanders:
[I]t is difficult if not impossible to perceive any objective criteria
by which that task might be accomplished. What one person may
put into a suitcase, another may put into a paper bag ....

In

short, the negative implication of footnote 13 of the Sanders
opinion is that, unless the container is such that its contents may
be said to be in plain view, those contents are fully protected by
41
the Fourth Amendment.
The Court's analysis in Robbins was based upon the automobile
exception, not upon a search incident to arrest. Under essentially
indistinguishable facts, 42 the Court reached paradoxical
resolutions, due exclusively to legal conjecture. This is not
37. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).

38. Id. at 422.
39. Id. at 424-25.
40. Id. at 425-28; see also Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65
n. 13. In Sanders, the Court noted that "[n]ot all containers and packages found
by police during the course of a search will deserve full protection of the
Fourth Amendment ....There will be difficulties in determining which

parcels taken from an automobile require a warrant for their search and which
do not." Id.
41. Robbins, 453 U.S. at 426-27.
42. The fact that the search in Robbins extended to the recessed luggage

compartment is of no moment insofar as the decision is concerned. Had the
tote bag and two opaque containers been recovered from the back seat (from
which Belton's jacket had been recovered), the decision would not have been
different. The bright-line rule the Court chose to employ in Robbins flowed
directly from the container itself. If it is closed and opaque, the Court held it
may not be opened without a warrant. Id. at 428.
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desirable if the Court is to afford guidance to its police and
citizens. Nor was it well-reasoned under Fourth Amendment
evaluation. The police, in each instance, acted under probable
cause to search the car; their behavior was reasonable. The
exclusionary rule was instituted to deter un)reasonable police
conduct. 43 In identifying such a disparate standard between car
searches and searches incident to arrests, the Court apparently
lost sight of the rationale for the rule.
The Robbins reasoning was flawed from another perspective,
its reliance upon Chadwick and Sanders as automobile exception
cases. Although it might be argued that they should have been so
characterized, the Supreme Court had held they were not. As
Justice Stevens correctly pointed out in his dissent, "Sanders and
Chadwick are both plainly distinguishable from this case because
neither case truly involved the automobile exception," due to the
incidental nature of the contact of the containers with the car in
both of those cases. 44 Stevens suggested his own bright-line rule:
"In my opinion, the 'automobile exception' to the warrant
requirement therefore provided each officer the authority to make
a thorough search of the vehicle-including the glove
compartment, the trunk, and any containers in the vehicle that

43. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Court stated
that
[t]he effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United
States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority,
under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and
authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses,
papers and effects against all unreasonable searches and seizures under
the guise of law. This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of
crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory
upon all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the
laws. The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the
country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced
confessions... should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts
which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and
to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the

maintenance of such fundamental rights.
Id. at 391-92.
44. Robbins, 453 U.S. at 445-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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might reasonably contain the contraband." 45 In the context of
Carroll and Chambers, this is entirely compatible. The
expectation of privacy in a closed, opaque container in an
automobile is at least identical to (and may even be less than) that
expectation in the upholstery or in a hidden compartment
underneath the dashboard. Accordingly, the same search criterion
46
ought to pertain to both.
A year later, Justice Stevens' dissent became the majority
opinion. In United States v. Ross, 47 the Court effectively
reversed Robbins4 8 and held that closed, opaque containers
properly seized under the automobile exception could now be
searched without a warrant. 49 The decision included a telling
reference to practical exigencies:
It is therefore significant that the practical consequences of the
Carroll decision would be largely nullified if the permissible
scope of a warrantless search of an automobile did not include
containers and packages found inside the vehicle. Contraband
goods rarely are strewn across the trunk orfloor of a car; since
by their very nature such goods must be withheld from public
view, they rarely can be placed in an automobile unless they are
50
enclosed within some form of container.

45. Id. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. See id. at 447-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens examined
the findings of Carroll and Chambers, which recognize the automobile
exception to the extent that a magistrate would authorize such search by a
warrant, and stated that "[i]f a magistrate issued a search warrant for an
automobile, and officers in conducting the search authorized by the warrant
discovered a suitcase in the car, they surely would not need to return to the
magistrate for another warrant before searching the suitcase." Id. at 448-49
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
48. The Court recognized the inconsistencies between Ross and Robbins,
and rejected Robbins' reasoning, but nevertheless failed to overturn its holding.
Id. at 824.
49. Id. at 817-825. The majority stressed that the underlying test had not
changed, "[m]oreover, the probable-cause determination must be based on
objective, facts that could justify the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate and
not merely on the subjective good faith of the police officers." Id. at 808.
50. Id. at 820 (emphasis added).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss3/3

10

Bogacz: Automobile Search

19941

AUTOMOBILE SEARCH

689

Ross, in a notable step forward in responsible jurisprudence,
announced a new clarification to the bright-line rule: "[t]he scope
of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not defined by
the nature of the container ... [but] by the object of the search
and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it
may be found." 5 1 The holding also had the practical effect of
narrowing Chadwick and Sanders to their precise situation, until
Acevedo provided an even greater level of uniformity by
reversing them.
While the Supreme Court was honing a purposeful bright-line
rule, New York's added component, the possible link between
probable cause to arrest and the search, was again being
considered by the court of appeals. In People v.Langen,52 New
York embraced the Ross rule regarding closed, opaque
containers. The court of appeals, however, also endorsed the
direct link standard. 53 New York now required a nexus between
the circumstances of the arrest and the probable cause to search
the car:
It is held that when the circumstances giving rise to probable
cause to arrest a driver or passenger in the automobile also
support the belief that the automobile contains contraband related
to the crime for which the arrest is made, police may search,
within a reasonable time after the arrest, any container, locked or
54
otherwise, located in the automobile.
Left conspicuously unaddressed was the Carroll-Chambers
circumstance, where the police lack probable cause to arrest and
only manifest probable cause to search the car. After Belton II,
however, and the majority's pronouncement in Langen that "the
above rule requires both probable cause to search the automobile
generally and a nexus between the probable cause to search and

51. Id. at 824.
52. 60 N.Y.2d 170, 456 N.E.2d 1167, 469 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1983), cert.

denied, 465 U.S. 1028 (1984).
53. Id. at 180-82, 456 N.E.2d at 1172-73, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 49-50.

54. Id. at 172, 456 N.E.2d at 1167-68, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 44-45 (emphasis
added).
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the crime for which the arrest is being made," 55 it is improbable
that the Carroll-Chambersrule had continued viability in New
York after Langen.

Less than a year later, in People v. Ellis,56 the court of appeals
was evidently uncomfortable with the Langen rule. It ignored the
nexus specification, finding that "[ilt was the probable cause to
believe a gun was in the car that gave the police officers grounds
for the search of the car," 57 when the defendant had been
arrested for a traffic infraction. 58 The court went on to declare
-that "[t]he basis for the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement is the reduced expectation of privacy associated with
automobiles and the inherent mobility of such vehicles." 59
Allusion to the nexus requirement of Langen is noticeably absent.
Was Ellis signaling a shift to the federal rule? Was New York
about to adopt the Carroll-Chambers analysis and bright-line
rule?
When confronted with this, the court of appeals hesitated. In
People v. Blasich,60 the court traversed a tentative line between
Belton HI, Langen and Ellis. Its midway stance now maintained

that "the proper inquiry in assessing the propriety of a Belton
search is simply whether the circumstances gave the officer
probable cause to search the vehicle. Whether the officer had
probable cause to arrest an occupant of the vehicle for one or
more crimes is significant." 61 Significant, but not mandated.
55. Id. at 181, 456 N.E.2d at 1173, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 50 (emphasis added).
56. 62 N.Y.2d 393, 465 N.E.2d 826, 477 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1984).

57. Id. at 397, 465 N.E.2d at 828, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 108.
58. Id. at 396-97, 465 N.E.2d at 827-28, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 107-08. The

court of appeals also applied the Ross-Langen rule, approving the search of a
locked glove compartment. Id. at 398, 465 N.E.2d at 828-29, 477 N.Y.S.2d at
108-09.
59. Id. at 397, 465 N.E.2d at 828, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 108.
60. 73 N.Y.2d 673, 541 N.E.2d 40, 543 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1989) (finding that
the police acted lawfully in searching defendant's automobile subsequent to the
police arresting him for impersonation while the defendant was questioned
regarding burglar's tools found on the front floor of his automobile).
61. Id. at 681, 541 N.E.2d at 45, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 45. The court

recognized the nexus requirement enunciated in Langen but noted that "nothing
in our decisions suggests that the [nexus requirement] refers only to charges
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Blasich appeared to leave open the prospect of a CarrollChambers type search, under certain facts. But this was far from
clear. In fact, probable cause to arrest was indeed present in
Blasich, thereby further obscuring the breadth of the new
posture.

At this point, it would be worthwhile to explore whether the
nexus requirement ought to exist at all. Many argue that without
any connection to the arrest of an occupant, the police have no
authority to conduct a warrantless search of a car, based upon
privacy implications concerning the vehicle. Is this not illusory?
Are not probable cause to arrest and probable cause to search two
separate and distinct concepts, each compelling its own legal
analysis? Magistrates daily authorize search warrants for
premises, based solely upon probable cause to search.
Automobiles are comparable to premises, with even a reduced
expectation of privacy. Since the Carroll-Chambers criterion
demands the identical standard for a warrantless car search which
would support the issuance of a warrant, it is consistent with
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. It furnishes reliable guidance
to our police and citizenry. It ought to be followed in New York.
The nexus standard itself is perhaps an inadvertent consequence
of the particular facts contained in Belton 11, which the court of
appeals erroneously deemed controlling in Langen. Comparison
of the language of each case is enlightening. Belton 11 makes no
effort to distinguish a separate "New York automobile exception"
from its federal counterpart. 62 Indeed, the majority opinion
favorably comments on the federal rationale for the exception:
"the reduced expectation of privacy associated with automobiles
and the inherent mobility of such vehicles."63 The decision can
appropriately be read as a case coincidentally involving probable.
cause to arrest, rather than requiring probable cause to arrest as
an obligatory predicate to the car search. In Belton II, the
formally announced by the arresting officer and we perceive no reason to adopt
such a narrow, formalistic approach today." Id. at 680, 541 N.E.2d at 44, 543
N.Y.S.2d at 44.
62. People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 53, 432 N.E.2d 745, 747, 447
N.Y.S.2d 873, 875 (1982).
63. Id. (citations omitted).
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probable cause to arrest happened to provide the underlying
justification to search the car; it was not imperative for that
purpose.
Langen, however, takes Belton II a full step further. Its
language is unmistakable: search pursuant to the automobile
exception "requires both probable cause to search the automobile
generally and a nexus between the probable cause to search and
the crime for which the arrest is being made. " 64 The Langen
court purportedly was applying the Belton II criterion. 65 In fact,
it established an unreasonably high standard which Ellis and
Blasich struggled to reconcile with their own facts.
The nexus yardstick continues to frustrate sound analysis by the
court of appeals. People v. Torres66 is instructive. The police
actions were based upon a rather detailed anonymous call:
[A]n individual known as "Poppo," who was wanted on
homicide charges, could be found having his hair cut at a barber
shop located at 116th Street and Third Avenue in Manhattan.
The suspect was described as a large, six-foot tall Hispanic male
wearing a white sweater, driving a black Eldorado and carrying
a gun in a shoulder bag. 67
These particulars were all corroborated by the detectives'
personal observations upon arrival at the precise location. 68 After
directing the defendant and a companion out of the Eldorado, the

64. People v. Langen, 60 N.Y.2d 170, 181, 456 N.E.2d 1167, 1173, 469
N.Y.S.2d 44, 50 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1028 (1984).

65. Id. In Langen, the court based its nexus requirement on its reasoning
in Belton II, by stating:
[W]hen "police have validly arrested an occupant of an automobile, and
they have reason to believe that the car may contain evidence related to
the crime for which the occupant was arrested or that a weapon may be
discovered or a means of escape thwarted, they may contemporaneously
search the passenger compartment, including any containers found
therein."
Id. (quoting Belton, 55 N.Y.2d at 55, 432 N.E.2d at 748, 447 N.Y.S.2d at
876).
66. 74 N.Y.2d 224, 543 N.E.2d 61, 544 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1989).
67. Id. at 226, 543 N.E.2d at 62, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
68. Id.
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detectives frisked them, with negative results. 69 One of the
detectives then reached into the front seat of the car and removed
the shoulder bag from where it had been left by defendant. 70 He
felt the outside of the bag and discerned the shape of a gun. 7 1 He
unzipped the bag and discovered a Rossi revolver and several
72
rounds of live ammunition.
The court of appeals suppressed the evidence finding that "[a]t
most, the detectives may have had a reasonable basis for
suspecting the presence of a gun."73 The court identified the
circumstance as squarely within the Belton II (although more
properly the Langen) context, with its nexus yardstick. 74 The
court thus found no justification for recovering the bag containing
the gun.75
This decision contains several disquieting aspects. First is the
conclusion that the police only possessed reasonable suspicion for
suspecting the presence of a gun.76 This disregards the fact that
the initial call specifically announced that "the bag contained a
gun" as Judge Bellacosa correctly pointed out in his dissent. 77 At
the time the bag was retrieved, this was no longer simply an
anonymous call situation. The express components of the call had
all been corroborated by the detectives' own observations, save
one: that the gun was in the bag. 7 8 A year prior to Torres, the
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 227, 543 N.E.2d at 63, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
74. Id. at 227-30, 543 N.E.2d at 63-65, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 798-800.
75. Id. at 230, 543 N.E.2d at 65, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
76. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
77. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d at 233, 543 N.E.2d at 67, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 802
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). Judge Bellacosa bases his opinion on
these facts and rejects the automobile exception under these circumstances by
stating that "this case is not controlled by the... automobile exception and
container standard of [Belton I]]," but it is instead supported by
[h]ighly detailed information reported to the police and manifestly based
on personal knowledge, corroborated in every observable aspect and
coupled with yet-to-be conformed data that the suspect is a violent felon-
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court of appeals had, for the first time, acknowledged that
specific information corroborated by independent observations
elevated the permissible level of police intrusion. 7 9 Given the
precision of the call and the corroboration of all the other details,
would not the police have an obligation to examine the bag?
The holding also portrayed as "unrealistic" and "far-fetched,"
the fear for the departing officers' safety once the defendant and
his associate were permitted to return to the vehicle and the
concealed weapon. 80 This is a questionable conclusion at best, as
Judge Bellacosa once again illustrated in his dissent. 8 1 That
opinion aside, however, the majority failed to take into account a
far larger array of potential victims, the general population. The
detectives in Torres were not only acting to safeguard
themselves, they also had a duty to protect others. 82 Given the

extent of their information, could they have responsibly permitted
the two suspects to return to the car and drive off, without first
examining the contents of the bag? Concern for public safety is
-armed and suspected of murder--provides more than adequate basis for
upholding the reasonableness of the officers' safeguarding actions.
Id. at 234-35, 543 N.E.2d at 68, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 803 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
79. People v. Salaman, 71 N.Y.2d 869, 522 N.E.2d 1048, 527 N.Y.S.2d
750 (1988) (finding that the police did not act unreasonably when they frisked
defendant who matched a description given by an anonymous informant as one
who was armed with a gun). The court stated that "[t]he officer was of course
duty bound to investigate the report." Id. at 870, 522 N.E.2d at 1049, 527
N.Y.S.2d at 751 (citations omitted).
80. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d at 230-31, 543 N.E.2d at 65, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
81. Id. at 232, 543 N.E.2d at 66, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 801 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted) (stating that "[t]he dangers may be 'farfetched' ... to Judges in the protected enclave of the courthouse, but not to
cops on the beat").
82. See id. at 236, 543 N.E.2d at 69, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 804 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting). Judge Bellacosa stated:

The officers' and innocent bystanders' safety concerns are not
alleviated, in law and certainly not in fact, by a frisk of the person only,
in this circumstance given the continuing, frighteningly real nature of
the threat presented by the accessibility of the gun as soon as the
defendant might reenter or reach into the car.
Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
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recognized as allowing police intrusion onto the very person of
the suspect. 83 In Torres, the police possessed the added
information that the gun was purported to be in the very bag that
was the subject of the intrusion. Is recovery of the bag and
"frisking" it from the outside any more intrusive than a frisk of
someone's person? In fact, it is far less so. Would the safety
concerns have been less "unrealistic" or "far-fetched" if the
police had gone directly to the bag without frisking the occupants
of the car?
The court of appeals itself, in People v. Brooks,84 had
acknowledged that a frisk need not be limited to the suspect's
person, but may properly extend to the suspect's "grabbable
reach," including "personal items capable of concealing a
weapon," such as a shoulder bag. 85 Given this practical analysis,
the Torres conclusion must be challenged. If the detectives had
directed the defendant to bring the bag with him when exiting the
vehicle, it would have remained within his grabbable area and,
thus subjecting him to a search under Brooks. Similarly, suppose
the detectives had ordered defendant to hand over the bag while
still seated in the car. Would this not have been upheld, and
appropriately so, following Brooks? Under these facts, it is
unreasonable to deny the police the ability to retrieve the bag
from the automobile simply because they first removed the
occupants.
It is suggested here that based upon the facts in Torres,
probable cause existed to search the bag in question, irrespective
of the presence or absence of any probable cause to arrest the
occupants of the Eldorado. The information was precise and
detailed, and corroborated in every regard except for the contents
of the bag. In Ross, the police similarly acted upon specific

83. See Salaman, 71 N.Y.2d at 870, 522 N.E.2d at 1048-49, 527
N.Y.S.2d at 751.
84. 65 N.Y.2d 1021, 1023, 484 N.E.2d 132, 132, 494 N.Y.S.2d 103, 103
(1985) (finding that the police conducted a permissible frisk of defendant and
personal items within the defendant's grabbable reach, as he matched a
description of someone seen waving a gun).
85. Id.
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information provided by an informant. 86 The details were less
particular than those in Torres; which directly referred to the
definite location of the gun (in the shoulder bag). 87
Under the federal rule, there is no question that in Torres
probable cause would have been found and the search of the bag
upheld under the automobile exception. This would have been a
suitable outcome. The nexus standard in New York prevented it
and generated an unrealistic result. In Torres, Judge Titone,
writing for the majority, proclaimed that "such [police] intrusions
must be both justified in their inception and reasonably related in
scope and intensity to the circumstances which rendered their
initiation permissible."' 88 This analysis was not utilized by the
court, despite its declaration. The detectives clearly possessed
ample information justifying their stop of defendant and his
associate, their frisks of both and their recovery of the bag
containing the concealed gun and ammunition. 89 The retrieval of
the bag was "reasonably related in scope and intensity to the
circumstances," given the specificity of their knowledge and the
degree of previous corroboration. Their handling of the bag was
also circumspect. The detective did not immediately open it.
Only upon noticing its "unusual weight," did he even take the
minimally intrusive step of feeling the outside of the bag. 90 Then,
and only then, having felt what he discerned to be a gun, did he
open the bag and uncover the gun. 91
86. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982). In Ross, a reliable
informant provided police with a detailed description of a man, named
"Bandit," selling narcotics supposedly stored in the trunk of his "purplish

maroon" Chevrolet Malibu with District of Columbia license plates, which was
parked at a specific location. Id. When the police observed a similar
automobile leaving the location with the driver matching the informant's
description, they stopped the automobile. Id. at 801.
87. People v. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d 224, 226, 543 N.E.2d 61, 62, 541
N.Y.S.2d 796, 797 (1989). See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
88. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d at 230, 543 N.E.2d at 65, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
89. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.

90. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d at 226, 543 N.E.2d at 62, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
91. Id. New York, of course, would have additional difficulty with this
course of events. Id. The detective felt the gun within the bag prior to

unzipping the bag. The court of appeals has recently rejected the "plain touch"
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The Tor-es holding also declined to apply the federal rule of
Michigan v. Long92 as a matter of state constitutional
construction. 93 The federal criterion is grounded in legitimate
exception to the warrant requirement. See People v. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106, 612
N.E.2d 298, 595 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1993); Matter of Marrhonda G., 81 N.Y.2d
942, 613 N.E.2d 568, 597 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1993). Each of these cases
implicated the ability of police officers to discern the contents of a bag,
container, etc., simply by touching the outside. Finding that "touching is
inherently less reliable and cannot conclusively establish an object's identity or
criminal nature," the court suppressed drugs in Diaz and 4 guns in Marrhonda
G. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d at 112, 612 N.E.2d at 302, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 944
(citations omitted). In MarrhondaG., the gun holding was particularly irksome
since in respondent's knapsack, an "officer felt what he believed to be the butt
and trigger guard of a gun." The touching of the knapsack was inadvertent; the
officer picked it up to move it. 81 N.Y.2d at 944, 613 N.E.2d at 569, 597
N.Y.S.2d at 663. The touching during that move was unavoidable. The
officer's sensory impression was unambiguous. Still, the court was
unconvinced. Instead of endorsing a plain touch exception, at least insofar as
guns are concerned, the court suggested alternative theories to perhaps allow
the bag to be opened, including grabbable area, consent and search incident to
arrest. It also recommended the securing of a search warrant, citing Arkansas
v. Sanders as authority, with no reference to California v.Acevedo. Id. at 945,
613 N.E.2d at 569, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 663.
The reference to grabbable area, of course, raises the same objections as
were previously lodged in the Torres discussion. In a more general sense, the
court failed to focus on the purpose of the exclusionary rule. As Judge
Bellacosa noted in his dissenting opinion, the police activity was "reasonable
and lawful." Id. at 946, 613 N.E.2d at 570, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 664 (Bellacosa,
J., dissenting). He concluded that the majority's analysis "elevates form over
substance." Id. at 946-47, 613 N.E.2d at 570, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 664
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting). By permitting an abstract criterion to obscure
examination of the reasonableness of the police conduct, the court
unnecessarily jeopardized the safety of the police and the public in its rejection
of the plain touch exception.
In this rebuff, the court had to drav an artificial distinction between a police
officer's ability to frisk a pocket or waistband and his or her proficiency to
"frisk" a bag or other container. The same officer who is competent to
ascertain the presence of a gun in a pocket, and to then go into that pocket and
recover the weapon (without the need to resort to a warrant), apparently lacks
the tactile capacity to do likewise in feeling the outside of a bag. This illogical
conclusion unfortunately emanates directly from the rejection of plain touch.
92. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
93. Torres, 74 N.Y.2d at 226, 543 N.E.2d at 62, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
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apprehension for the safety of the police and the general public. 94
As Justice O'Connor announced in the majority opinion:
[T]he search of the passenger compartment of an automobile,
limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or
hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable
belief based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant" the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous
and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons. 95
This is a direct and sensible application of the Supreme Court's
definition of a police officer's ability to stop and frisk, as
enunciated in Terry v. Ohio,96 to the vehicle context. It is
noteworthy that the decision also asserted that "the officers did
not act unreasonably in taking preventive measures to ensure that
there were no other weapons within Long's immediate grasp
before permitting him to reenter his automobile."' 97 Ostensibly,
the Supreme Court did not find it "far-fetched" that if a suspect
is allowed to re-enter the car, "he will then have access to any
weapons inside." 9 8 Its inquiry pragmatically focused on whether
or not the police conduct was reasonable. 99
The Long rationale won apparent endorsement in New York in
People v. Lindsay, 100 wherein the court of appeals upheld a
search of the area of an automobile under the driver's seat,
following a negative frisk of the driver which was based upon
reasonable suspicion. 10 1 Lindsay, however, was decided solely
94. Long, 463 U.S. at 1045-52.

95. Id. at 1049 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
96. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
97. Long, 463 U.S. at 1051 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 1052 (citing United States v. Powless, 546 F.2d 792, 795-96
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 910 (1977)).
99. Id. at 1046. In Long, the Court applied the reasonable standard
principles enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, in which the Court noted that it "'need
not develop at length in this case ...

the limitations which the Fourth

Amendment places upon a protective search and seizure for weapons. These
limitations will have to be developed in the concrete factual circumstances of
individual cases.'" Id. at 1047 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29).
100. 72 N.Y.2d 843, 527 N.E.2d 279, 531 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1988).
101. Id. at 844-45, 527 N.E.2d at 279, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
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on a federal constitutional claim. 102 Its viability under the state
constitution was left an open question, which Torres answered,
albeit in the negative. 103
The post-Torres case law has further regressed into a clutter of
confusion. 104 The next noteworthy holding was People v.
102. Id. at 845, 527 N.E.2d at 280, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 797. The court
reasoned that based on federal law, the search under the driver's seat was
"limited to those areas in which a weapon could have been placed or hidden
and because the officers

. .

. 'possess[ed] an articulable and objectively

reasonable belief that the [occupants were] potentially dangerous' and might,
upon reentering the car, gain immediate control of a weapon secreted in that
area." Id. (alterations in the original) (quoting Long, 463 U.S. at 1051).
103. Following Lindsay, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second
Department, employed the same reasoning to facts virtually identical to those
in Torres (but prior to Torres), in sustaining the search of a bag in a vehicle
which the police ordered vacated, after a touch of the bag revealed the
presence of a gun. People v. Wilson, 150 A.D.2d 628, 541 N.Y.S.2d 499 (2d
Dep't 1989). Similarly upheld was a police request that a suspect in a car hand
over a brown paper bag, which the officer had a reasonable belief it contained
a gun. People v. McClane, 143 A.D.2d 848, 533 N.Y.S.2d 326 (2d Dep't
1988). The second department also sustained the search of an automobile tnmk
for which the police had "probable cause to detain the occupants," based upon
information that a gun had been used in a robbery, for which this was the
purported "getaway car." People v. Torres, 145 A.D.2d 664, 665, 536
N.Y.S.2d 176, 177 (2d Dep't 1988), appeal denied, 73 N.Y.2d 927, 538
N.E.2d 370, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1989) (citing People v. Ellis, 62 N.Y.2d
393, 465 N.E.2d 826, 477 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1984)).
104. Several appellate division decisions have followed Torres, even when
presented with additional facts which might have provided a reason to
distinguish it. See People v. Theodis, 155 A.D.2d 339, 341, 547 N.Y.S.2d
310, 312 (1st Dep't 1989) (applying Torres after noting that there were
significant differences from Torres), appeal denied, 75 N.Y.2d 872, 552
N.E.2d 882, 553 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1990); see also People v. Mullins, 196
A.D.2d 894, 602 N.Y.S.2d 156 (2d Dep't 1993) (suppressing handgun found
under automobile seat after a radio transmission and an unidentified man told
officers that the defendant's automobile had a gun in it); People v. Carbone,
184 A.D.2d 648, 585 N.Y.S.2d 68 (2d Dep't 1992) (suppressing controlled
substances found in leather bag of automobile when officers searched the bag
after noticing pink pills next to it on the automobile's floor); People v. Pena,
155 A.D.2d 310, 547 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1st Dep't 1989) (applying Torres despite
the fact that the information was provided to the police by a citizen-informant,
not anonymously); People v. Drayton, 172 A.D.2d 849, 569 N.Y.S.2d 212 (2d
Dep't 1991) (following Torres despite the fact that the police observed the
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Coutin, 10 5 in which the court of appeals, in a memorandum
decision, sustained a car search based upon "reasonable suspicion
to stop the car . . . , reasonable concern for [the officers']
safety . . . , and probable cause to search the interior of the car

for a weapon and evidence of the crime."

10 6

The court curiously

defendant "fumbling around" under the front seat and a frisk revealed an
empty holster in his waistband), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 921, 577 N.E.2d
1066, 573 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1991). Constrained by Torres, the second
department, held that these facts did not "warrant a search under the passenger
compartment of the defendant's automobile." Id. at 851, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 214.
The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, likewise, found
no basis to search a car after a negative frisk (based on reasonable suspicion),
even though an empty holster was observed on the passenger seat in People v.
Snyder, 178 A.D.2d 757, 577 N.Y.S.2d 678 (3d Dep't 1991), aff'd, 80
N.Y.2d 815, 600 N.E.2d 620, 587 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1992). Under the federal
rule, of course, it is likely that both of these fact patterns would be deemed
probable cause to search the car for a gun.
Occasionally, reference to Torres is conspicuously absent. See People v.
Rodriguez, N.Y. L.J., May 11, 1990, at 34 (2d Dep't May 10, 1990). In
Rodriguez, a state trooper demanded to be shown whatever the passenger of a
car was attempting to secrete under the seat, due to safety considerations. Id.
The court upheld this demand with no mention of Torres. Id. Similarly, in
People v. Sprinkler,

__

A.D.2d

_,

603 N.Y.S.2d 550 (2d Dep't 1993), the

second department sustained the retrieval of a gun from under the defendant's
seat in a car. The court ignored Torres, even though the police were apparently
acting upon reasonable suspicion, not probable cause. Id. at

_,

603

N.Y.S.2d at 551. Torres has also been cited as a cross-reference. See People
v. Jean-Louis, 154 A.D.2d 393, 395, 545 N.Y.S.2d 782, 783 (2d Dep't 1989)
(sustaining the search of a bag under a car seat after a sudden "frantic" hand
movement by the passenger).
Most recently, in People v. Alston, 195 A.D.2d 396, 600 N.Y.S.2d 688 (1st
Dep't 1993), the first department somewhat awkwardly distinguished Torres in
sustaining a search under the passenger seat of a vehicle properly stopped for a
traffic infraction. Id. at 398, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 690. After the stop, the
passenger made furtive movements under the seat and was ordered out of the
car by the officer, who then retrieved a gun from under the seat. Id. at 397,
600 N.Y.S.2d at 689. Since the driver remained in the auto, the court was able
to distinguish Torres by underscoring the abiding danger to the police
generated by that factor. Id. at 398, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 690. Of course, had the
police also removed the driver from the vehicle (thereby advancing their
safety), the gun undoubtedly would have been suppressed under Torres.
105. 78 N.Y.2d 930, 578 N.E.2d 431, 573 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1991).
106. Id. at 932, 578 N.E.2d at 431, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
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made no reference to Torres, even while discussing reasonable
suspicion. 10 7 ,More puzzling is that it affirmed the first
department holding which relied on Lindsay,10 8 and in which
Torres was cited by the dissent. 10 9 Factually, the specificity of
the knowledge in the officers' possession was at the approximate
level as in Torres. Yet, the first department had opted to base its
ruling on "the existence of reasonable suspicion to support a
limited search for weapons." 110 Is this not at least the minimum
level under which the officers acted in Torres?
In a subsequent memorandum decision, People v. Jacbon,1 1 1
the court of appeals distinguished Torres by upholding the search
of a bag well within the defendant's immediate reach. 1 12 Instead
of removing defendant from the car, the police, acting out of
safety concerns, conducted a "rather cursory examination of the
bag ... while defendant was still sitting in the car."113 This is
appropriate and reasonable. Given the inherent danger involved
in any car stop, 114 however, is it wise to require the police to
inspect the container while it is still within the suspect's reach?
Would it not be safer for all concerned to first remove the
suspect's access to the container, prior to the police searching it?

107. Id.
108: 168 A.D.2d 269, 272-73, 563 N.Y.S.2d 394, 396 (1st Dep't 1990),
aff'd, 78 N.Y.2d 930, 578 N.E.2d 431, 573 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1991).

109. Id. at 274, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 397 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (finding that

"once the occupants were out of the car, the officers had no right, without

further inquiry or arrest of the occupants, to search the recesses of the
automobile for a handgun").
110. Id. at 272, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 396 (emphasis added).
111. 79 N.Y.2d 907, 590 N.E.2d 240, 581 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1992).
112. Id. at 909, 590 N.E.2d at 241, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 656.
113. Id.
114. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1977) (stating

that the Court has "recognized the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he
approaches a person seated in an automobile," including the risk of shootings
by suspects and accidental injuries caused by passing traffic); People v.
McLaurin, 70 N.Y.2d 779, 515 N.E.2d 904, 521 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1987)
(discussing Minms to justify an officer's insistence that a suspicious passenger
step out of the automobile while the driver was being investigated).
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Jackson squarely places the Torres holding in the illogical
posture of compelling the opposite.
I
In Coutin and Jackson, .the court of appeals again appeared to
be moving away from the Langen-Torres nexus criterion. Once
more, however, the court hesitated. In People v. Snyder, 115 the
court reverted to the Torres rationale. After the police stopped a
vehicle under suspicion concerning an assault, and received
further information that a handgun may have been involved, they
removed the occupants from the automobile and frisked them
(with negative results). 116 After observing an empty holster on
the seat, they searched the car and retrieved an automatic
pistol. 117 Applying Torres, the court of appeals suppressed the
gun on appeal, holding that "the police lacked probable cause to
believe that defendant's vehicle contained a weapon or evidence
118
of a crime."
The allusion to evidence of a crime clearly refers to the nexus
standard, as it once again obscures the fundamental inquiry: did
the police have probable cause to believe a gun was in the car?
Although the court held negatively, this was due, at least in part,
to the nexus requirement, as Torres interpreted Langen. The
addition of the empty holster to the details which the police
already had ought to have afforded sufficient probable cause to
search the car, irrespective of any basis to arrest the occupants.
The inquiry regarding the justification to search the car must be
conducted with no reference to probable cause to arrest.
Most recently, in People v. Galak,119 the court once again
sought to articulate a purposeful nexus standard. However, by
relying upon the tentative connection established in Blasich, 120
the court merely guaranteed further confusion. Factually, Galak

115. 80 N.Y.2d 815, 600 N.E.2d 620, 587 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1992).
116. People v. Snyder, 178 A.D.2d 757, 757-58, 577 N.Y.S.2d 678, 679
(3d Dep't 1991), aff'd, 80 N.Y.2d 815, 600 N.E.2d 620, 587 N.Y.S.2d 893

(1992).
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 758, 577 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
Snyder, 80 N.Y.2d at 816, 600 N.E.2d at 620, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
81 N.Y.2d 463, 616 N.E.2d 842, 600 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1993).
See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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is comparable to Blasich,12 1 in that the police in both cases acted
upon a "combination of evidence-derived both before and during
the stop." 122 The Galak court asserted that such a combination
"provided not only probable cause to search but a sufficient
nexus between the probable cause and the arrest," citing Blasich
as authority. 123 Blasich, however, seemingly declared that
probable cause to arrest an occupant of the vehicle was
"significant" but not mandatory. 124 Galak appears to assert the
opposite. Of course, as previously discussed, the scope of the
Blasich holding is by no means unclouded and Galak contributes
no additional clarity.
Our highest Court regularly reminds us that regarding car
searches, there is "no dispute among judges about the importance
of striving for clarification in this area of the law;" 125 the need
for "an approach that would give more specific guidance to
police and courts;" 12 6 "the virtue of providing "clear and
unequivocal' guidelines to the law enforcement profession.'" 127
This, of course, is a commendable aim. "When a person cannot
know how a court will apply a settled principle to a recurring
factual situation, that person cannot know the scope of his
121. In Galak, the police stopped the defendant who was driving an
automobile believed to be stolen, and the defendant revealed incriminating
evidence concerning the true ownership of the automobile. Galak, 81 N.Y.2d
at 465-66, 616 N.E.2d at 843,.600 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
122. Id. at 468, 616 N.E.2d at 845, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 188.
123. Id.
124. People v. Blasich, 73 N.Y.2d 673, 681, 541 N.E.2d 40, 45, 543
N.Y.S.2d 40, 45 (1989). The court stated that
the proper inquiry in assessing the propriety of a Belton search is simply
whether the circumstances gave the officer probable cause to search the
vehicle. Whether the officer had probable cause to arrest an occupant of

the vehicle for one or more crimes is significant. Which of those crimes
the officer selected when formally notifying the suspect that he was

under arrest has little bearing on the matter.

Id. (emphasis added).
125. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 789, 803 (1982).
126. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 435 (1981)

(Powell, J.,

concurring).

127. California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1990 (1991) (citations
omitted).
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constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of
128
his authority."
In this context, bright-line rules that are propitious and abstract
distinctions may be detrimental. The Supreme Court has
manifested a willingness to hone purposeful bright-line rules to
cover most car search scenarios. The New York Court of
Appeals has been too hasty to reject "this bright-line approach to
automobile searches" 129 as a matter of state constitutional law.
Too much legal scholarship results in too many spurious
distinctions, precipitating confusion and disservice to the public.
New York's pivotal failure to adopt the Supreme Court's
rationale has produced a failure to guide and a failure to protect.
The Carroll/Chambers/Ross/Acevedo line of cases has
propagated fair and reasonable analysis. The underlying purpose
behind the exclusionary rule has resulted in a sound inquiry in
every federal car search: did the police act under color of
probable cause sufficient to justify the issuance of a warrant by a
magistrate? An affirmative response satisfies the Fourth
Amendment, permits responsible police behavior and more than
reasonably protects against police abuses.
The Belton/Langen/Ellis/Blasich/Torres/Coutin/Snyderline, on
the other hand, offers only confusion and is internally
inconsistent and often contradictory. The specter of New York's
nexus consideration is ever present. It interferes with objective
evaluation and must be eliminated. Probable cause to search a
vehicle must be scrutinized by its own independent analysis
utilizing the federal standard, if we are ever to attain Judge
Gabrielli's objective.

128. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1981).
129. People v. Blasich, 73 N.Y.2d 673, 678, 541 N.E.2d 40, 43, 543
N.Y.S.2d 40, 43 (1989).
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